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NOTE
THE END OF AN ERA: CLOSING THE
EXCLUSIONARY DEBATE UNDER HERRING V
UNITED STA TES
I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly a century, aggressive judicial correction of government
abuses has protected individual privacy rights. Favoring result over
method, many of the Supreme Court's remedies attract harsh criticism
for their heavy-handed but uncertain application-subject to constant
metamorphoses while maintaining a distinctive bite. Perhaps most
galling to critics is the policy of exclusion, inciting spirited debate since
its inception.1 Despite the name of the doctrine, the exclusionary "rule"
of the Fourth Amendment looks nothing like a "rule" at all thanks to its
numerous and expansive exceptions. Historically amorphous, even slight
variations on fact patterns reap widely disparate judgments when the
suppression of evidence is at stake. Indeed, the rule's good faith
exception, incontrovertibly established in United States v. Leon,2 has
been consistently redrafted to account for those wrinkles encountered in
the unpredictable realm of law enforcement. 3 Such ambiguity has likely
been tolerated because all incarnations of the exception have thus far
hinged upon one unifying principle: those members of the police
department involved in disputed searches and seizures have acted with
objective reasonableness. This stasis is now threatened, however, by the
Court's 5-4 decision in Herring v. United States, where officers who
1. See, e.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) (providing the infamous
criticism that the exclusionary rule permits the criminal to go free because "the constable has
blundered").
2. 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006). ("In sum, the social costs of
applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are considerable; the incentive to
such violations is minimal to begin with, and the extant deterrences against them are substantialincomparably greater than the factors deterring warrantless entries when Mapp was decided. Resort
to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified.").
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sought to invoke the exception, despite error on the part of internal
personnel, were granted immunity from exclusionary tenets.4
Far from being a mere procedural quirk, the exclusionary rule
pivots on fundamental issues such as privacy, Federalism, and judicial
efficacy.5 The policies underlying exclusion, namely, deterrence of
police misconduct and removal of inducements to unreasonable
invasions of privacy,6 bear considerable constitutional import. So too,
the good faith exception softens the rule, countering the criticism that
exclusion diminishes the integrity of the legal system by permitting
obviously guilty criminals to skirt punishment. A danger arises,
however, when an exception is permitted to swallow the rule that gave it
credence.
Herring has garnered attention for good reason. The Court
originally recognized the good faith exception where a defective warrant
issued from a neutral magistrate and an officer reasonably relied upon it
in a subsequent arrest and search.7 The factual variation in Herring,
however, deviates markedly from those currently articulated in the
register of good faith scenarios that sustain compliance. Here, the
offending player was actually a member of a neighboring Sheriffs
Department's staff-not, as has typically been the case, a member of the
judiciary.8 Balancing the tension between the need for deterrence and the
impediments imposed by strict application of the exclusionary rule upon
the truth-finding functions of the judge and jury, it is apparent that the
Supreme Court should not have applied the good faith exception to the
case at bar. Such a holding undermines exclusion's value in situations
where police "personnel" fail to observe the requisite objective good
faith standards required by the decision in Leon.9 This Note posits that
the Supreme Court should have refrained from further expanding the
breadth of the exclusionary rule's good faith exception in Herring.10 The
decision portends an irreversible erosion of exclusionary rule
protections. By permitting police to reference negligence by other law
4.
5.
6.
7.

129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009).
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-07.
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979).
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20.

8.

See Herring,129 S. Ct. at 698.

9. 468 U.S. at 919-20. ("In short, where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable,
'excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way;
for it is painfully apparent that ...the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act
in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is
to make him less willing to do his duty."' (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting))).
10. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704.
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enforcement agents as a defense to motions for suppression, the Court
has contradicted its only justification for applying good faith in previous
decisions: the executive's evenhanded reliance upon neutral sources that
are unaffected by the rule's deterrence capabilities."'
Part II analyzes two distinct eras in exclusionary jurisprudence: the
first struggling to establish the rule's supremacy in both federal and state
practice; the second, arguably still in vogue, attempting to methodically
diminish the impositions placed upon police conduct by the first.
Herring came on the crest of this reactionary wave-illustrating a
significant factual discrepancy that should have precluded its inclusion
in the newest line of cases ignoring exclusionary standards. It was the
Court's duty to buck this trend before finding itself with a total absence
of effective Fourth Amendment protections for complainants. Part III
will track the development of the good faith exception and the coverage
it currently affords in the context of searches and seizures. It will also
make clear why Herring makes a terrible candidate for good faith
consideration. Part IV examines the unique role that the collective
knowledge doctrine plays on Herring'sspecific facts-strengthening the
position that good faith has been improperly asserted in the case. Finally,
Part V will consider potential alternatives to exclusion (noticeably
absent from the decision) and analyze the Court's continued preference
for the deterrent benefits of exclusion.
II.
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXCLUSION

Early Decisions Uniformly Extend the Reach of Exclusion Beyond
the Scope of the FederalCourts

No one case can be cited as the seminal articulation of exclusionary
principles in the Court's extensive effort to remedy individual violations
of Fourth Amendment rights. This has contributed, in no small part, to
the precarious circumstances giving rise to the Herring scenario now
considered. Having developed around case-specific fact patterns, each
new application provides an opportunity to wholly redefine the
prevailing interpretation of exclusionary tenets. For the first fifty years
of the rule's existence, the Court's penchant for exclusion produced a
host of cases that promoted increasingly broader adherence to the
remedy. By 1961, this trend would peak, with mandatory observance
required in both the federal and state courts.
11.

See Leon, 468 U.S. at 909.
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The rule's first incarnation took form with the opinion in Weeks v.
UnitedStates, 12 in which it was declared:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United
States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of [their]
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons,
houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and
seizures .... The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of
the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures... should find no sanction in the judgments of the
13
courts ....

The Weeks Court asserted two justifications for excluding illegally
obtained evidence. First, it believed that exclusion was the only
meaningful way to assure that officials honored the Fourth Amendment
guarantee of reasonable privacy.1 4 It further expressed concern that any
endorsement of constitutionally offensive behavior would tarnish the
integrity of the judiciary. 15 Summing up the important federal interests at
stake, the Court cautioned:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.'
Though a major step in the formation of a cogent theory of
exclusion, the opinion contained one glaring blemish in that it
specifically rejected applications of the rule (and the Fourth Amendment
itself) to misconduct by state or local police.17 Such inconsistency would
prove highly problematic as the implications of such an omission were
fully realized. 18 A response came in Wolf v. Colorado,'9 which
addressed, for the first time, the growing predicament facilitated by the
void in exclusionary rule coverage.

12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruledby Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92.
14. Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 398.
See infra text accompanying notes 25-27.

19.

338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruledby Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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In Wolf, the Court expounded that enforcing Fourth and Fourteenth
20
Amendment rights in the States raised "questions of a different order,"
namely, "[h]ow such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what
remedies against it should be afforded, [and] the means by which the
right should be made effective.",2 1 These, it deemed, were "all

questions... not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the
varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment on
issues not susceptible of quantitative solution., 22 The Court thus
recognized the application of Fourth Amendment principles on state and
local officers through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
because "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion. . . is
basic to a free society, 2 3 but refused to compel application of the
exclusionary rule as the only acceptable remedy for constitutional
violations. At least mildly convinced that the rule offered certain utility
in federal cases, the Court nonetheless instructed:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective
way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to
condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due
Process Clause a State's reliance upon other24 methods which, if
consistently enforced, would be equally effective.
Ascribing to the States the responsibility of fashioning penalties
that would ensure observance of the search and seizure clause among
their executive branches, the Court portrayed the exclusionary rule as a
wholly federal device-capable of adoption should individual States so
choose, but by no means compulsory.25 This line of reasoning persisted
for twenty more years, during which federal agents made use of this
enforcement discrepancy by exploiting the "silver platter doctrine,"
which allowed the use in federal court of evidence seized illegally by
state and local police. 26 Consequently, exclusion was readily
circumvented where state officers proffered the illegal evidence. This
gave federal prosecutors the "wholesale ability to include illegally

20.

Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28.

21.
22.

Id.
Id.

23. Id.
at 27.
24. Id. at 31.
25. John B. Rayburn, Note, What is "Blowing in the Wind"? Reopening the Exclusionary
Rule Debate, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 793,799 (2008).
26. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1379
(1983).
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obtained state evidence because the actions of state officials were not
judged under federal standards. ' 7
28
Again, the Supreme Court countered in Elkins v. United States,
delivering a decision that ultimately held state officers accountable to
Fourth Amendment standards in investigations where federal law would
be implicated. Henceforth, evidence seized under the authority of any
officer, state or federal, in violation of constitutional mandates was
deemed inadmissible in a federal court. 29 Two important grievances
were thus redressed: First, the decision assured that although the states
bore no restrictions on the use of the evidence in their own courts, they
would nevertheless "suffer some deterrence in that [their] federal
counterparts would be unable to use the evidence in federal criminal
from using a
proceedings.,30 Second, it "discouraged federal authorities
31
Weeks.,
of
restrictions
the
circumvent
to
official
state
Elkins continued a tradition of "exclusionary expansion" practiced
by the Court since Weeks, affording the rule greater bite with each
successive visitation. The decision very nearly realized the full extent of
the doctrine's capabilities with the exception that it did not prohibit the
use of disputed evidence in an offending officer's respective state court.
This final measure was imposed in Mapp v. Ohio,32 a decision that
established the rule's primacy as the favored deterrent for Fourth
Amendment infringements. The Court reasoned, "[s]ince the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used
against the Federal Government. 3 3 The decision expressed a concern
that,
[w]ere it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of
words," valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
27. Jeffrey E. Nicoson, Note, A Case for Certiorari: Whether Federal Courts Should
Consider State Law When Admitting State-Collected Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 46 U.

LOUISVILLE L. REV. 335, 338 (2007).
28. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 223.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1976).
Id. at446.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 655.
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coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's
34 high regard as a freedom
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
This language, much like that of the cases preceding Mapp,
expressed a greater concern for the "imperative of judicial integrity," a
justification that has faded in modem exclusionary decisions. 35 Even
more interestingly, the majority's summation of the opinion included no
discussion of the rule's deterrence benefits-by all accounts the most
prominent rationale asserted by today's courts.3 6 Although just twelve
years had passed between Wolf and Mapp, the Court premised much of
its decision on a growing perception that no alternative state remedies
could provide Fourth Amendment protections as readily as could
exclusion.37 As discussed in Part V, existence of adequate remedies
therefore became a significant factor to be weighed before courts
imposed the harsh evidentiary penalty.
Thus was the state of exclusionary jurisprudence before the Court
embarked upon its systematic corrosion of the standard's framework.
This second phase was precipitated by the rule's classification as a mere
"court-made remedy" without constitutional backing. Permitted to
devise unique alternatives and exceptions to the rule that drew heavily
on the inference that they were not constitutionally required to impose a
singular penalty on illegally obtained evidence, the judiciary hastily
turned its back on a remedy meticulously crafted by its predecessors.3 8
Whereas Mapp signaled the height of exclusion's influence on state and
federal evidentiary admissibility, successive opinions have so distanced
themselves from the policies of Weeks and its progeny that, today,
Herring stands to render the rule virtually obsolete.
B. The Court Has Recently Adopted a Policy of Withdrawalfrom
Mapp, Devising Exceptions that Threaten to Swallow the Exclusionary
Rule in Its Entirety
Legitimized on the national stage by Mapp, the exclusionary rule
enjoyed a brief period of undisturbed supremacy in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence before new judicial tendencies began to slowly erode a

34. Id.
35.

Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33

WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261, 268 (1998).
36. See id. at 266.
37. Raybum, supranote 25, at 799.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (characterizing the rule as a
"judicially created remedy" rather than a "personal constitutional right").
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half-century of federal precedent. While the Mapp Court had stated that
"the exclusionary rule was 'part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's
limitation upon governmental encroachment of individual privacy' and
'an essential part of [both] the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,' ' 39
this concept soon proved burdensome to police and courts alike, many of
whom had already criticized the penalty as an excessive reaction that
bestowed undeserved benefits on wrongdoers.4 ° Commentators, too,
"maligned exclusion as a 'crude' deterrent ' 4' and undoubtedly
contributed to its demise post Mapp. So began the second, and current,
stage of Supreme Court exclusionary decision-making--one favoring
greater Executive autonomy and tempering evidentiary standards.
1. Shifting Focus: Deterrence and Cost-Benefit Analysis
The watershed moment came in 1974 with the opinion handed
down in United States v. Calandra.42 There, a witness summoned to
appear before a grand jury was not permitted to disregard questions on
the ground that they were based on the fruits of an unlawful search.43
Though the holding spoke only to a relatively narrow circumstance
(grand jury proceedings), the Court reinforced its decision with a critical
declaration that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved. '44 This limited approach to exclusion was premised in part on
the language of the Fourth Amendment itself, which says nothing of the
remedial device, much less its role as sole guarantor of any
constitutional right to privacy.4 5
Calandra went far beyond redefining the Fourth Amendment
implications of exclusion, however. The Court also made "explicit" a
tentative balancing approach considered in previous decisions 46 and
39. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 356 (4th ed. 2005)
(quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, 657).
40. See, e.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (noting the resistance and scrutiny the
new doctrine faced in state courts).
41. See Bryan D. Lammon, Note, The Practical Mandates of the Fourth Amendment: A
Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 WASH. L. REV. 1101,

1102 (2007).
42. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
43. Stewart, supra note 26, at 1390.
44. Calandra,414 U.S. at 348.
45. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 39, at 356.
46. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) ("The deterrent values
of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered
sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence .... But we are not convinced that the
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declared it to be "the test for determining whether illegally obtained
evidence must be excluded from a particular class of proceedings. ' ' 7 In
keeping with one constant tradition in the Court's exclusionary analysis,
Calandra's cost-benefit approach maintained a markedly fact-specific
focus48-considering social costs explicit to the context of grand jury
proceedings and not, as many would expect, the general social costs of
the exclusionary rule.49 As for the rule's potential benefits, the Calandra
Court conceded that "[s]uppression of the use of illegally seized
evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial is thought to be an
important method of effectuating the Fourth Amendment." 50 But,
reiterating that the rule in no way exemplified a universal constitutional
right, it concluded that "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might
be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain
at best." 51 In sum, the benefits that would be achieved by the rule's
application did not warrant "' substantially impeding the role of the grand
jury.

52

The ruling has led many to contend that the years between Mapp
and Calandra saw "the exclusionary rule degenerate[] from an engine
for the protection of individual constitutional rights and of the integrity
of the judiciary to a cost-accounting problem. 5 3 In any event, the newly
minted balancing test proved instrumental in promoting the rise of the
second stage of thought, littered with opinions that have found the
respective social costs at issue to outweigh the benefits of exclusion.54
Notably, the Court has decided on the basis of the test that impeachment
proceedings were exempt from exclusion's reach,55 that testimony
obtained from those witnesses found through illegal searches was not
additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.").
47. Stewart, supranote 26, at 1391.
48. Calandra,414 U.S. at 349 ("In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to grand
jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand
jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this context.").
49. Rayburn, supra note 25, at 806.
50. Calandra,414 U.S. at 350.
51. ld.at351.
52. Rayburn, supra note 25, at 807. (quoting Calandra,414 U.S. at 352).
53. Norton, supra note 35, at 267.
54. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
454 (1976) (holding that "exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by
a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring
the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion").
55. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980).
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impermissible as fruit of the poisonous tree,56 and that an arrest founded
on the authority granted by an unconstitutional substantive criminal
statute would not merit exclusion. 57 Yet, perhaps most significant in the
Court's new cost-benefit analysis has been its development of the good
faith exception.
2. Tipping the Scales with Good Faith
Good faith is useful in the balancing context as it repudiates the
argument that exclusion will serve a deterrent function. 58 Though
mentioned intermittently prior to 1984, the exception gained legal
recognition in the landmark case United States v. Leon.59 There, officers
executed a facially valid search warrant issued by a State Superior Court
Judge and discovered large quantities of drugs at respondent Albert
Leon's residence. 60 Even though the affidavit in support of the warrant
request was subsequently found insufficient to establish probable cause,
the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was not excluded at trial,
despite Leon's objection, because the officers had acted with objectively
reasonable good faith.61
To justify its newly-formulated exception, the Court borrowed
heavily from Calandra, reasoning that the exclusionary rule had no
constitutional basis, as "[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear
that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure 'work[s] no new
Fourth Amendment wrong. ' ' ' 6 2 In this vein, since the constitutional
wrong occurs when the illegal search or seizure occurs-and not when
the evidence is admitted at trial--exclusion is "neither intended nor able
to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already
suffered."', 63 With the stature of the rule thus diminished, the Court
formally set forth Calandra'sbalancing test as the standard to determine
the merits of suppressing evidence obtained in this manner. 64 It
considered the implications of "interfering with the role of the judge and

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980).
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1987).
See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984).
Id. at 902.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
Id.(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
Id.at 906-07.
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jury" 65 and allowing some guilty defendants to go free 6 6 as the main
social costs imposed by applying exclusion to the facts at hand. Against
these concerns, the Court found that only minimal deterrence could be
expected as a potential benefit, as "the exclusionary rule [was] designed
to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and
magistrates. 67 Because the officers here acted upon an invalid warrant,
the culprit-that is, the "detached and neutral magistrate" 68-would
have little incentive to modify his conduct should exclusion be enforced.
Good faith excusal is thus deemed applicable when "marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in
objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion., 69 Integrating
previous decisions while careful not to overtly trod on Mapp, the Court
in Leon utilized the balancing test as a capable device to circumvent the
strict controls of exclusion's early
precedent-a strategy that it has
70
embraced in subsequent decisions.
Among these later opinions, Arizona v. Evans71 enjoys facts most
72
comparable to those of Herring.
Evans dealt with an officer's good
faith reliance on a warrant that had been quashed, but not removed from
court records, two weeks before a traffic stop uncovered marijuana in the
defendant's car.73 Examining the procedure by which such voided
warrants were removed from the Sheriffs Department's database, the
Court discovered that negligent performance on the part of a justice
court clerk had resulted in the discrepancy.74 This, when coupled with
Leon's strong presumption against applying exclusion against the
mistakes of those situated outside the Executive Branch, supported a
"categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court
employees., 75 The majority reasoned that "[b]ecause court clerks are not
adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive

65. Rayburn, supranote 25, at 808.
66. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
67.

Id. at 916.

68. Id. at 900.
69. Id at 922.
70. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule should not apply to civil deportation hearings where likely additional deterrent
value would be small and the social costs of application would be high).
71. 514 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1995).
72. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698-99 (2009).
73. Evans, 514 U.S. at 4.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 16.
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enterprise of ferreting out crime, they have no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions. 76
More importantly for the context of Herring,the opinion served to
bestow upon "virtually all court personnel the detachment and neutrality
found in judges and magistrates. 7 7 Thus, where the Leon court limited
' 78
itself to "distinguishing officers from 'judges' and 'magistrates,'
Evans expanded the division, "isolating all law enforcement personnel,
even civilian clerks, from 'court employees."'' 79 Lumping law
enforcement personnel indiscriminately with law enforcement officers
should have been dispositive, if the distinction had held onto Herring,
where the exception was sought in spite of in-house misconduct.8 ° In this
respect, Evans is valuable in providing an articulation of the subtle niche
that exclusion is supposed to occupy.
And yet, Evans is also a decision that permitted an arresting officer
to rely upon a "representation that an arrest warrant existed"-not upon
the arrest warrant itself.8 1 This "warrantless good faith exception" to
exclusion, far removed from the context of Leon's intended good faith
rationale, serves as a shield to the very kind of behavior that warrants
were meant to forbid8 2 and established a theoretical basis upon which the
officers in Herring mounted their case.83 Evans thus offered both
assistance and impediments to the government's argument, giving
credence to the "warrantless good faith" concept but also explicitly
distinguishing police employees from court personnel.84 Faced with this
interesting tension, the Court was primed in 2006 to reevaluate its
85
exclusionary position when it addressed in Hudson v. Michigan
whether the exclusionary rule applied to knock-and-announce violations.

76. Id.at 15 (citation omitted).
77. George M. Dery III, The Unwarranted Extension of the Good Faith Exception to
Computers: An Examination of Arizona v. Evans and its Impact on the Exclusionary Rule and the

Structure of FourthAmendment Litigation,23 AM. J.CRIM. L. 61, 81 (1995).
78. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)).
79. Id. (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 14).
80. Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
81. Dery, supra note 77, at 82.
82. Id. at 83 (claiming that the Court's extension of Leon to warrantless situations outstrips
the good faith exception's original rationales).
83. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 703-04.
84. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995).
85. 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006).
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3. The Race to the Bottom
In Hudson, the Court sought to address whether the exclusionary
rule applied to violations of the knock-and-announce rule,8 6 which
stipulates that police officers must adequately communicate their
presence when executing a search warrant at an individual's home.87 The
rule is designed to protect citizens in their homes against property
damage and privacy infringements that flow from unannounced entry by
officers.88
The complaint in Hudson stemmed from a police search, pursuant
to a warrant, that uncovered large quantities of cocaine rocks and
firearms in the home of petitioner Booker Hudson. 89 He argued that the
officers' method of entry, namely, waiting only three to five seconds
after announcing their presence to enter his home, violated Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.90 After outlining the judiciary's stance on
the knock-and-announce rule, Justice Scalia reiterated the Court's
cautious position "against expanding" the exclusionary rule, 91 and its
"repeat[ed] emphasi[s] that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and
law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its]
application., 92 Justice Scalia found two distinct costs incurred by
application of exclusion to knock-and-announce cases. First, it would
provide criminals a "get-out-of-jail-free card" because evidence of their
guilt was suppressed. 93 Second, he worried that overextending the rule
would "produce a flood of cases where individuals would claim that
either officers violated the knock-and-announce rule or that the various
94
exceptions that permit officers not to knock were inapplicable."
Finding against these interests only minimal deterrence benefits,95 the
majority held that "[r]esort to the
massive remedy of suppressing
96
unjustified.,
[was]
guilt
of
evidence

86. Id.at 590.
87. Jessica M. Weitzman, Note, They Won't Come Knocking No More: Hudson v. Michigan
and the Demise of the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1209, 1212 (2008).
88. Id
89. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588.
90. Id.
91. Id at 591 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)).
92. Id.(quoting Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1998)).
93. Id.
at 595.
94. Weitzman, supranote 87, at 1221.
95. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596.
96. Id.
at 599.
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Seen as the beginning of the end for the Fourth Amendment
exclusion remedy, 97 the opinion serves chiefly to suggest that the
"Kennedy Court" 98 is likely to "remain very deferential to police in
criminal procedure cases for the foreseeable future." 99 The "willingness
of four Justices-Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-to overrule
decades-old precedents and eliminate the exclusionary rule certainly
gives a sense" that exclusion's continued application in the realm of
Fourth Amendment consideration is precarious at best.'0 0 Alluding
heavily to the existence of alternative remedies capable of filling the
void that would be left by exclusion's termination, the Hudson court
seemed to anticipate as much.' 0 ' Indeed, coupled with Herring'snewest
spin on the doctrine, it is painfully clear that "'the heydays of [the
Court's] exclusionary-rule jurisprudence,' and the 0days
of its 'reflexive
2
end.'
an
at
are
rule"'
exclusionary
the
of
application
Herring came on the cusp of this anti-exclusionary fervor. The
limitations imposed by this second stage, rife with decisions intent on
deconstructing barriers raised long ago to protect vital Fourth
Amendment privacy interests, have gone far to remove themselves from
the near ubiquitous exclusionary applications of Mapp. It was important
in the opinion, then, for the Court to reevaluate the utility of exclusion
and take strides to restore, at least in part, a threat of evidentiary
suppression. It failed to do so. This Note thus argues that reconciling old
and new must begin at the micro level, that is to say, with the highly
scrutinized cost-benefit inquiry. Therefore, Part III will examine good
faith's substantial distortion and the subsequent impact on balancing test
results since Calandra.Distinguishing the facts of Herringfrom those of
97. See, e.g., Jennifer Yackley, Note, Hudson v. Michigan: Has the Court Turned the
Exclusionary Rule into the Exclusionary Exception?, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 412 (2007); Adam
Cohen, Is the Supreme Court About to Kill Off the ExclusionaryRule?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009,
at A22; Analysis: Exclusionary Rule in Trouble?, Supreme Court of the United States Blog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-exclusionary-rule-in-trouble/ (June 15, 2006, 12:11 EST).
98. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN
BAG 2D 335 (2006) (expanding on the power of Justice Kennedy to decide the outcome of cases
before the Court with his swing vote).
99. Id.at 344.
100. Id.
101. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597 ("Dollree Mapp could not turn to... 42 U.S.C § 1983, for
meaningful relief; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which began the slow but steady
expansion of that remedy, was decided the same Term as Mapp.... Citizens whose Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by federal officers could not bring suit until 10 years after Mapp,
with this Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. NarcoticsAgents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).").
102. Sharon L. Davies, Some Reflections on the Implications of Hudson v. Michigan for the
Law of Confessions, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2007) (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S at 591,
597).
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typical "exception-eligible" cases, Part IV will show that here, while still
remaining faithful to precedent, the Court should have ruled good faith
inapplicable.
4. A Recitation of the Facts of Herring
On July 7, 2004, Bennie Dean Herring drove to the Coffee County,
Alabama Sherriff's Department to retrieve an item from his impounded
10 4
truck. 10 3 After a brief search of the vehicle, he prepared to leave.
However, at that moment, Investigator Mark Anderson arrived at work
and spotted the defendant (with whom he had some history) exiting the
lot.'0 5 Knowing that there was good reason to suspect that there might be
an outstanding warrant for Herring's arrest, Anderson immediately
asked the warrant clerk for the Sheriffs Department to inspect the
county's database.01076 The search revealed no active warrants for Herring
in Coffee County.1
Undeterred, Anderson next asked the warrant clerk to contact the
Sheriffs Department in neighboring Dale County to see if there were
any outstanding warrants for Herring there. 0 8 The subsequent search of
the Dale database produced an active warrant charging Herring with
failure to appear on a felony charge.109 Acting quickly on the
information, Investigator Anderson and a Coffee County deputy sheriff
followed Herring as he drove away from the Department."t0 They pulled
him over and arrested him on the strength of the Dale Country
warrant.' The officers' ensuing search turned up some amount of
methamphetamine 2 in Herring's pocket as well as a pistol under the front
seat of his truck."
In the meantime, the Dale County warrant clerk that had issued the
information had yet to locate a copy of the actual warrant that Anderson
had relied upon to effect Herring's arrest.1 3 Fearing that her search may
be in vain, she checked with the Dale County Clerk's Office, which
informed her that the warrant had been recalled some five months

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

108.

Id.

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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earlier. 14 This information was immediately relayed to Coffee County,
but the officers on scene had already performed the search just
described.11 5 All of
this occurred within ten to fifteen minutes, according
6
to court records. 1
Herring was indicted on charges of possessing methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 1 7 He moved to suppress
any evidence of the methamphetamine and firearm on grounds that the
searches that turned them up were not incident to a lawful arrest,
because the arrest warrant on which the officers acted had been
rescinded."18 The District Court denied the motion because the arresting
officers had acted in a good faith belief that the warrant was still
outstanding, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. " 9
When compared against previous cases in the Leon120 era, it is clear
that Herring presented a unique scenario under which modern
exclusionary interpretation would favor a defendant. From Calandra's
balancing approach 12 to the more deferential good faith standard
discussed in Part III-all signs pointed to a rare application of the potent
remedy. Instead, the Court, with great bravado, skewed the rule's
interpretation to facilitate a desired outcome. As a result, exclusion can
no longer be looked upon with certainty, as the Court has proven that it
will refuse to consider cases bearing on the issue even-handedly, instead
propagating an agenda on behalf of the nation's Executive Branch (a
troublesome stance to be taken under a Constitution principled on the
merits of checks and balances).

114. Id.
115.

Id.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 699.
118. Id.

119. Id.
120. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
121. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974).
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III. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION, LONG EXPLOITED TO DISRUPT THE
COST-BENEFIT EQUILIBRIUM, SHOULD RECEIVE CONSIDERATION ONLY
WHERE A POLICE DEPARTMENT HAS ABSTAINED FROM CONTRIBUTING
TO A SEARCH'S ILLEGALITY.

The Fourth Amendment serves as the Constitution's chief arbiter of
individual rights and privacy. 122 The protection that the Amendment
affords is "prophylactic," as it "is designed to prevent, not simply to
redress, unlawful police action." 123 As such, the exclusionary rule is
"neither intended nor able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights
which he has already suffered.' 1 24 It is "calculated to prevent, not to
repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it.' 25 Deterrence is the palpable consequence of
exclusion. Unlike maintenance of an "imperative ofjudicial integrity," it
can be measured and regulated and, perhaps most importantly, play upon
an intense American aversion to excessive regulations of liberty and
privacy. Deterrence is the most conspicuous of exclusionary rationales-126
asserted by many as the only viable justification for the rule.
Exceptions to exclusion, therefore, have been premised almost
exclusively on deterrence in the post-Mapp foray of decisions limiting
exclusion's reach. Good faith, the prototype for all such exceptions, has
found solid recognition (for good reason) among federal courts since its
introduction in United States v. Leon 127 due to its seamless conformity
with the deterrence justification and related balancing test analyses. As
this section will demonstrate, however, good faith is only germane under
exceedingly specific circumstances, and it was error on the part of the
Court to apply it under the Herringfact pattern.
The good faith exception is generally used to advance the
presumption of minimal deterrence within a cost-benefit context. As
discussed above, the fact-specific Calandra balancing test was
established to weigh the potential deterrent benefits of exclusion against
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
123. Lammon, supra note 41, at 1101 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12
(1969)).
124. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
125. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
126. Stewart, supra note 26, at 1399.
127. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37:839

the social costs imposed when evidence is suppressed.1 28 Even without
the aid of good faith, the Court has traditionally expressed a heavy
propensity for evidentiary admissibility. 2 9 Factoring in the exception,
then, only tips the scales further in favor of admission. For instance, the
Leon Court deftly employed its new good faith standard to downplay the
deterrence benefits typically associated with exclusion, reasoning that
"the marginal or nonexistent [deterrent] benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial
costs of exclusion."'' 30 Among those principal costs of exclusion cited by
the Court was its "interference with the criminal justice system's truthfinding function," such that "some guilty defendants may go free or
receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. 1' 31 In
this way, good faith developed into a nearly fool-proof method of
skirting exclusionary burdens. Once it can be established that the
exception applies under a given set of facts, deterrence can no longer be
practically weighed against the register of social costs implicit in the
rule's application, and exclusionary cases become rather one-sided.
Herring, however, should not have presented an opportunity for the
Court to further extend its already burgeoning dependence upon good
faith "evasion." Leon should be considered the rare exception. There,
California officers initiated a search sanctioned by a warrant issued by a
State Superior Court Judge.1 32 The subsequent discovery of large
quantities of drugs was nullified, though, by a District Court
determination that the warrant lacked sufficient probable cause. 133 Using
Calandraas an outline, the Leon Court explained, "[a]s yet, we have not
recognized any form of good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. But the balancing approach that has evolved during
the years of experience with the [exclusionary] rule provides strong
support for the modification currently urged upon US.' 134 First, the Court
conceded that "great deference" should be accorded a magistrate's

128. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
129. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The FourthAmendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1195 (1988)
(stating that "the Supreme Court too often has conducted its [F]ourth [A]mendment balancing tests
with 'the judicial thumb ...planted firmly on the law-enforcement side of the scales').
130. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (emphasis added).
131. Id.at 907.
132. Id.at 902.
133. Id. at 903.
134. Id.at 913 (footnote omitted).
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decision to issue a search warrant. 135 Moreover, "the exclusionary rule is
designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of
judges and magistrates."1' 36 Last, and most importantly, the Court could
"discern no basis," and was "offered none, for believing that exclusion
of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant [would] have a significant
deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.' ' 137 Since little to no
evidence existed suggesting that "judges and magistrates are inclined to
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment" (as police may be tempted to
do), and where official action was pursued in complete good faith, the
Court deemed the extreme sanction of exclusion to be improper after
weighing social costs against the potentially38 nonexistent benefits
amassed by penalizing the offending magistrate. 1
The Court's argument rested heavily on the presumption that the
deterrence rationale fails when officers acting with "objective good
faith" obtain a search warrant from a judge and proceed within its
scope 139 because "an assessment of the flagrancy of the police
misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus."' 140 Therefore,
instance
this
in
that
determined
Court
Leon
the
future
officer's]
[an
affect
no
way
in
[could]
evidence
"'[e]xcluding ...
' 41
5
duty.""
his
do
to
willing
less
him
make
to
is
it
conduct unless
Such reasoning cannot be reconciled with Herring. This most
recent decision by the Court opines, "To trigger the exclusionary rule,
police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is
worth the price paid by the justice system."' 142 Such an argument
contaminates the persuasive rhetoric of Leon. It is a regression back to
Calandra balancing-absent any true good faith validation.
Consequently, the decision serves not to clarify situations where police
involvement in the faulty search is more direct, but only highlights the
Court's unwillingness to streamline its exclusionary procedure.
Introducing an approach that now focuses on an officer's level of
culpability-and downplaying Leon's heavy reliance on the offending
135. Id. at 914 (noting that while deference to a magistrate is not boundless, these "neutral and
detached" entities are more readily positioned to make a reasonable determination of warrant
viability).
at916.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.at 916, 922.
139. Id.at920.
140. Id.at 911.
141. Id.at 920 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
142. Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
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actor's identity143-Herring has removed the only bright-line distinction
available to defendants seeking exclusion. 144 Now, such determinations
become even more subjective, with some "good faith" dispensation
available for culpable conduct by officers involved in the search itself. In
effect, the question becomes not "Who was at fault?" but "How wrong is
too wrong?"-a standard that will permit more posturing by executive
officers and, accordingly, more court approval of tainted evidence. So,
despite the Court's fervent assertion "that 'our good-faith inquiry is
confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably
well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal' in
light of 'all of the circumstances,"",145 the practical reality of the decision
is that the test has become more attenuated from objectivity, permitting
greater flexibility to an Executive Branch already dominating
exclusionary jurisprudence.
An examination of the Evans judgment supports this point. Evans,
146
as discussed above, holds most true to the facts disputed in Herring.
There, a police search of defendant's car pursuant to an outstanding
misdemeanor warrant produced some quantities of marijuana and an
eventual arrest.1 47 Despite its presence in the Sheriffs Office's database,
however, the warrant had been quashed seventeen days prior to
defendant Evans' arrest. 148 The discrepancy was not remedied only
because it was the duty of the Chief Clerk's office (a judicial entity) to
call and notify the Sherriff's Department of any changes in a warrant's
status.149 Both the Clerk's
and Sheriff's records indicated that no such
150
made.
been
had
call
With much emphasis given to the fact that the mistake had
originated from the Clerk, and not from the Phoenix Police Department,
the Court applied the good faith exception and upheld the officer's
search."'5 Professedly applying the reasoning of Leon, the Court deduced
that "exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future
52
errors [by court employees] so as to warrant such a severe sanction'
because "the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of
143.

Id.

144. Id.at 703
145. Id.(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).

146. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
147. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995).
148.

Id.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.at 5.
Id.
Id.at 16.
Id.at 14.
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' 53
deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees."'
Further, no evidence existed to support the proposition "that court
employees [were] inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment."'' 54 Most importantly, the Court determined that there was
"no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these
circumstances [would] have a significant effect on court employees
responsible for informing the police that a warrant [had] been
quashed."'' 55 Scrutinized closely by the Leon Court, this crucial last point
applied similarly in Evans because court clerks, like judges, "are not
adjuncts to the law enforcement team,"
having "no stake in the outcome
' 56
of particular criminal prosecutions."'
Despite what appeared to be a clear distinction drawn between nonlaw enforcement and law enforcement error in Evans, the Court in
Herring extended the exception to officer misconduct by arguing that
"[a]n error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is
thus far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the rule in
the first place."' 157 Given previous interpretations, this line of reasoning
seems misplaced where mistakes emanated solely from police
employees. On this point the Court offers little guidance-neither
specifying whether "attenuation" as used pertains to time, place, or
personnel (court clerks as opposed to officers). This limitation "appears
to refer to the fact that the clerical error was made five months before the
arrest and made by personnel other than the arresting officer,"' 58 but the
point is not made explicit. It is possible that "[t]he Court may be leaving
open the possibility that the good faith exception requires that the officer
conducting the illegal search ... is not the same officer who made the
error."' 159 Its reasoning, however, is not consistent with this proposition
either. 60 The only real effect of the language's inclusion, therefore, 16is1
further strengthening an already heavy presumption against exclusion.
And, even if swept aside as an unintentional reference to past

153.

Id.

154. Id. at 14-15.
155. Id.at 15.
156. Id.
157. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (emphasis added).
158. Herring and the Exclusionary Rule, Posting of Richard McAdams to The University of
Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/01/herring-andthe-exclusionary-rule.html (Jan. 17, 2009, 00:06 EST).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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exclusionary cases, Herring's ambiguity nonetheless skews precedent
and provides unpersuasive support for its ultimate decision.
That being said, it is apparent that the Court erred in making certain
appeals to good faith in its opinion in Herring. Its newest "spin" on the
exception, designed to compensate for the obvious factual limitations of
the case, further perverts an analysis already tending towards Executive
preference. The opinion incorporates levels of "tolerable culpability" for
officers-a revision that confuses both the logic and efficiency of the
original good faith scheme laid out in Leon. Now, "[t]o trigger the
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system."' 162 No
consideration is given to the maker of the mistake. Instead, blame is
assigned only where an officer's behavior rises to a level considered a
"[']flagrant or deliberate violation of rights.' ' 163 In this regard, negligent
conduct appears to be exempt from exclusionary penalty. 164 Only, for
example, where "police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a
warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the
groundwork for future false arrests"'' 65 will exclusion be applied. A
system of such leniency is useless for the protection of Fourth
Amendment rights. Whereas the bright-line distinction drawn in Evans
between law enforcement and other actors offered at least some
consistency to the application of the rule, Herring's outcome befuddles
the once reasonable rationalization for good faith.

IV. BOLSTERED BY THE DIRECTIVES OF THE COLLECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE, THE FACTS IN HERRING SHOULD NOT HAVE
SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR SUPPRESSION.
A. The Collective Knowledge Doctrine,All but Forgotten in the
Court's Typical Good FaithAnalyses, Should Have Been Highly
Influential to the Herring Decision
Further consequences flow from the Herring Court's new focus on
the mental culpability of the wrongdoer, and not-as had been the
162. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 702 (emphasis added).
163. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CAL. L. REv. 929, 953 (1965)).
164. Id at 704.
165. Id at 703.
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convention beforehand-on her identity. The Dale County Sheriffs
Department blunder offered the Court its "perfect storm"-an
extraordinary collision of fact, theory, and precedent. It failed to act on
this anomaly. Herring, unlike any other major exclusionary case in the
last half-century, may have implicated the long dormant collective
knowledge doctrine-seen only infrequently since its introduction some
forty years ago. 166 The theory, traditionally employed to insulate conduct
performed by one officer (acting only with constructive knowledge) on
behalf of another (with actual knowledge), may have been used in the
reverse to attribute one officer's negligence onto another acting in
concert for the purposes of exclusion. 67 Such arguments have been
expressed throughout the Leon era, but, until Herring,no fact pattern has
existed that convincingly supported the inference. 168 The slight factual
rift distinguishing Herring from its predecessors-police responsibility
in authorizing the unlawful search-could have given credence to the
potential application of collective knowledge. The opinion, however,
carefully foreclosed this line of argumentation by pardoning the officer's
negligent conduct. 169 The Court thus missed an opportunity to employ
fresh legal concepts on a considerably lopsided and stagnant area of
criminal procedure.
First outlined in Whiteley v. Warden, 7 ° the collective knowledge
doctrine was designed to serve an agency function,' 71 offering an
"especially pure example of a rule that increases the efficacy of policing
without tipping the Fourth Amendment balance."' 172 In essence, "[w]hen
an officer sends out a message deputizing others to act for him, the
recipients are treated as standing in his shoes and sharing his knowledge,
and so the validity of the arrest turns on whether that knowledge was
sufficient for probable cause."' 173 In Whiteley, a local police department

166. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567 (1971).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995) (noting that "Whiteley clearly retains
relevance in determining whether police officers have violated the Fourth Amendment," but that "its
precedential value regarding application of the exclusionary rule is dubious").
169. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 ("In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect
of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system, we conclude that
when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic
error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not 'pay its
way."') (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 n.6 (1984)).
170. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 567.
171. Simon Stem, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause,
Decisionmaking,82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2007).
172. Id. at 1100.

and Administrative

173. Id. at 1094-95.
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in Wyoming, absent the requisite probable cause necessary to obtain a
valid warrant, issued a state item over the radio giving the names and
descriptions of two suspects potentially responsible for a breaking and
entering. 174 The message was transmitted throughout the state and
received by officers in a number of jurisdictions. 175 Relying only on the
information offered by the radio item, patrolmen from neighboring
Laramie Police Department initiated an arrest and search of the suspects'
car which revealed a number of objects introduced as evidence in the
ensuing trial. 176 Though the Supreme Court would eventually apply the
exclusionary rule (due to the initial department's overt lack of probable
cause), it introduced the theoretical basis for the collective knowledge
doctrine, avowing, "[c]ertainly police officers called upon to aid other
officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the
officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to
support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause." 177 Acting
on a properly executed warrant obtained by unaffiliated officers would
thus not violate Fourth Amendment privacy rights. However, where "the
contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be
insulatedfrom challenge by the decision of the instigatingofficer to rely
' 178 Herring presented a model
on fellow officers to make the arrest."
illustration of the latter scenario, and the Court, following a Whiteley
construction, should have excluded the evidence seized by Coffee
County deputies.
Courts have been remarkably hesitant to utilize collective
knowledge as an impediment to police activity. The rule, which imputes
those facts known by the first officer at the time of instruction onto the
acting officer, so that "one officer's actual knowledge becomes another's
constructive knowledge,"' 179 has been used almost exclusively at one end
of the spectrum: "permit[ting] searches and arrests when there is no
instruction and no officer has probable cause."' 80 But this interpretation
is decidedly insular.
More appropriate, in cases like Herring,would be an application of
collective knowledge that also imputes a first officer's negligence (or
worse) onto "field agents." Drawing a direct corollary between the

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 562-63.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id. (emphasis added).
Stem, supra note 171, at 1089.
Id. at 1089-90.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss3/6

24

Doherty: The End of an Era: Closing the Exclusionary Debate Under Herring
2009]

CLOSING THE EXCLUSIONARY DEBATE

"deputizing" officer and acting officer, this framework would
democratize collective knowledge, still providing safe harbor where
appropriate (the traditional function), but no longer insulating negligent
conduct by officers who happen to be working in concert. It is an
egregious misinterpretation to allow the doctrine to stand as is. The mere
coincidence of joint police work should not present such inequitable
advantages to Executive personnel. A more even-handed approach
would substantiate the doctrine's credibility and application under
Herring-likecircumstances.
Leon considered the influence of collective knowledge on
exclusionary tenets, but, like Evans, lacked the requisite collaborative
police conduct found in Herring.18 Therefore, the Court hypothetically
discussed the possibility, stating:
It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the
officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers
who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the
probable-cause determination. Nothing in our opinion suggests, for
example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a "bare
bones" affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the
circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the
search. 182
8
Further clarification would come in United States v. Hensley,'

3

where the Court reasoned:
[W]hen evidence is uncovered during a search incident to an arrest in
reliance merely on a flyer or bulletin, its admissibility turns on whether
the officers who issued the flyer possessed probable cause to make the
arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the flyer were
themselves aware of8 the
specific facts which led their colleagues to
4
seek their assistance.1

Both opinions explicitly foreclosed the benefits of collective
knowledge where the initial communicator lacked sufficient probable
cause or engaged in misconduct.
Tailored to the facts of Herring, it would seem that such attitudes
should have controlled the outcome therein. Finally addressing a
situation where both exclusion and collective knowledge converged, this
inference should have been arrived at almost implicitly. The Dale
181. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984).
182. Id. at 923 n.24.
183. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
184. Id.at231.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37:839

County warrant clerk, a member of the Sherriff s Department, hastily
relayed incorrect records to Coffee County, thus resulting in a wrongful
search. 85 Imputing her negligence (through collective knowledge) to the
acting officers would have barred a good faith defense, and exclusion,
by necessity, would have followed. Instead, the decision denies Herring
the opportunity to utilize collective knowledge altogether, as identity no
longer factors into the Court's analysis. 86 Thus stricken entirely from
the realm of exclusion, aggrieved plaintiffs lose still more ground to an
ever expanding Executive immunity. Endorsed as a "relatively costless
way of increasing a police department's efficiency,"' 87 it seems a drastic
and unnecessary measure to reject all applications of collective
knowledge in these cases. It is certainly difficult-almost impossibleto find doctrinal support for such a blatant double standard. Where
information exchanged between officers, only one of whom is
performing a search, can effectively sanitize otherwise inadmissible
evidence, these same communications, when erroneous, should operate
to disqualify the items at issue.
V. THERE EXIST No ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES TO EXCLUSION
CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING THE KIND OF DETERRENCE NECESSARY TO
COMPEL POLICE REGARD FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY RIGHTS.

Although absent from the Court's latest opinion, most exclusionary
cases reference the availability of various alternatives to exclusion and
188
premise decisions in large part on the efficacy of innovative remedies.
Indeed, following Mapp, there was a strong presumption that "[t]he
existence of adequate alternative remedies may be the 'touchstone of the
inquiry' in determining whether and to what extent the exclusionary rule
should apply to the states.' 89 But, "[i]n considering whether the
185. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
186. See supratext accompanying notes 162-63.
187. Stem, supra note 171, at 1090 (emphasis added).
188. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596-97 (2006) (claiming that the increased
availability of civil suits and attorney's fees for civil-rights plaintiffs provide alternative remedies
for search and seizure violations, resulting in diminished need for deterrence); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949) (stating that "[t]he common law provides actions for damages against the
searching officer[;] against one who procures the issuance of a warrant maliciously and without
probable cause[;] and against persons assisting in the execution of an illegal search") (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he
exclusionary rule was founded on, and is grounded in, the continuing exercise of pragmatic judicial
supervision of the law enforcement activities of the executive branch, effectuated by expansion and
contraction of the bubble of proximate cause as courts face particular concrete factual situations.").
189. Raybum, supra note 25, at 802 (quoting Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893,
900 (5th Cir. 1977)).
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exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, the inquiry into the
existence of adequate alternative remedies must examine the present, not
the past." 190 Thus, proposals have been widespread, ranging from civil
damage actions and injunctions to criminal prosecution of offending
92
officers.1 91 Of these, civil damage actions are most frequently cited,'
offering relief under statute or case law depending upon whether the
offense issued is from state or federal enforcement agencies,
respectively. 193 At the heart of the inquiry are a suggested remedy's
deterrent capabilities-a principal concern in cases addressing Fourth
Amendment violations. 194 Exclusion maintains its primacy, therefore,
because "the most 'powerful' remedies, criminal prosecutions for willful
violation of the fourth amendment and actions for injunctions against
large-scale
violations,
are
rarely
brought
and
rarely
succeed.... [D]amage actions are also expensive, time-consuming, not
readily available, and rarely successful.' 95 Therefore, "the deterrent
effect of these actions can hardly be said to be great, since the prospect
of a judgment for money damages is extremely remote."' 196 Despite these
deficiencies, the existence of alternative remedies is a relevant inquiry
deserving at least menial consideration, and Herring further errs in
failing to address it whatsoever.
A.

Civil Damage Actions

Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to give "private citizens and
businesses the power to sue the government when it violates their
constitutional or federal statutory rights."' 97 The Act provides in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
190.
191.

Stewart, supra note 26, at 1385.
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 39, at 361-63.

192.

Id. at 361.

193. id. at 361-62.
194. Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as PrivateAttorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 249 (1988).
195. Stewart, supra note 26, at 1388.

196. Id.
197. Jessica L. Brumley, Note, Avoiding Mere Incantations: Evaluating Success on Nonfee

Claims When DeterminingPrevailing-PartyStatus Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 58 DUKE L.J. 687, 688
(2009).
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shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress .... 198
In addition to the statute, the Supreme Court had earlier provided
plaintiffs a cause of action againstfederal officers for alleged violations
of federal law in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.199 Working in conjunction, the law and ruling
make it a crime for anyone acting under color of law to deprive a person
of rights protected by the Constitution-including the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 200 Both were relied on heavily
by Justice Scalia in Hudson,2 °1 where it was suggested that the need for
exclusion had been directly undermined by their development. 20 2 Some
commentators agree, finding distinct benefits to civil damages. First, the
remedy compensates both innocent victims of a Fourth Amendment
violation as well as those guilty of criminal offenses.20 3 Exclusion, on
the other hand, only benefits wrongdoers struggling to check
introduction of evidence in a subsequent trial. Second, civil damages
introduce an element of "proportionality because the amount of a
judgment may be varied to reflect the egregiousness of the constitutional
violation., 20 4 No amount of judicial creativity can create this kind of
flexibility with the exclusion remedy. Lastly, imposing a sanction
directly upon individual violators, civil damages produce a "measure of
what is frequently described as 'specific deterrence.' 20 5 It can easily be
argued that exclusion does not produce the desired deterrent effect
advocated by the courts because offending officers do not feel the direct
sting of punishment. Instead, the costs of exclusion are borne more
generally by the justice system and society.20 6 In this light, civil damages
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
199. 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
200. See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 39, at 361-62.
201. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and the Police, in EIGHTH ANNUAL SUPREME
COURT REVIEW: OCTOBER 2005 TERM 17, 20 (2006) (stating that Scalia, in Hudson, places "the
presumption against the application of the exclusionary rule"); Rayburn, supra note 25, at 827 ("In
applying Calandra [in his opinion in Hudson], Justice Scalia discounts the need for deterrence
based on present day civil remedies and the current state of professionalism and training in law
enforcement.").
202. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) ("As far as we know, civil liability is an
effective deterrent here, as we have assumed it is in other contexts.").
203. Stewart, supra note 26, at 1387.
204. id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (stating that "[a]n objectionable
collateral consequence of [exclusion's] interference with the criminal justice system's truth-finding
function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of
favorable plea bargains").
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may prove their utility in illegal search and seizure cases, dodging
exclusion's extreme sanction in situations of less offensive police
conduct, and thereby encouraging courts to provide restitution where
deserved.
But, the civil damage remedy is not without drawbacks. Perhaps of
greatest concern is partiality of juries.2 °7 The average citizen is "inclined
to believe the testimony of law enforcement officials because the vast
majority of them are honest and endeavor to perform their jobs in
accordance with the Constitution." 20 8 When coupled with the good faith
exception, 209~it becomes extremely difficult to obtain a judgment against
police. 210 Furthermore, competent counsel is difficult to obtain in these
actions, as the likelihood of success is still doubtful at best. 21 1 Lastly, no
guarantee of payment can be made when the responsibility falls squarely
upon the individual officer 212 because, like all other civil defendants,
police can be deemed judgment proof, thus precluding the possibility of
any recovery. These deficiencies were seized upon and highlighted by
the Rehnquist Court, which crippled civil damage remedies when it
adopted an "expansive conception of the 'qualified immunity' available
to police officers' 21 3 in search and seizure cases.214 In this regard, the
Herring decision loses nothing of substance in failing to address the
possibility of civil damages, but for the sake of scholarship, the omission
only adds to a prevailing sense of incompleteness. In an effort to further
strengthen its decision (a shaky one by all accounts) it was the Court's
responsibility to address even minute facets of exclusionary scrutiny.
Civil damages have been promoted extensively as a viable replacement
for exclusion. 1 5 Total disregard for their existence is but another
example of the Court's contrived analysis.
207. Stewart, supranote 26, at 1387.
208.

Id.

209. See supratext accompanying notes 128-30.
210. Stewart, supranote 26, at 1387-88.
211. Id.at 1388.
212. Id.
213. Thomas Y. Davies, An Account of Mapp v. Ohio that Misses the Larger Exclusionary

Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 619 n.1 (2007) (reviewing CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V.
OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (2006)).

214. Id.("In particular, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), ruled that officers are
entitled to immunity, and thus to the pretrial dismissal of such suits prior to discovery, unless case
law existing at the time of the police misconduct clearly established that the police conduct at issue
violated the Constitution. In other words, lawsuits against police will be dismissed unless prior case
law has previously declared unconstitutional virtually the same police conduct in virtually the same
factual situation.").
215.

See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv.

757, 757-58 (1994) ("Much of what the Supreme Court has said in the last half century-that
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OtherPotentialAlternatives Are Similarly Uncertain to Produce the
DeterrentEffects Necessary to Advocate for Their Use

It therefore bears to briefly examine other proposed remedies for
Fourth Amendment violations. Prior to the Mapp decision, 1 6 state courts
had experimented with a host of alternative remedies, as the Court was

reluctant to interpret the Constitution as demanding exclusion upon any
but federal jurisdictions. 1 7 Today, alternatives are still cited, but

typically disregarded under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Among
the most prominent include imposition of governmental liability,
criminal prosecution of offending officers, and police regulations
coupled with departmental discipline.2 18
of
At the federal level, the Federal Tort Claims Act 2 19 creates a rule 220
exceptions,
broad
several
to
subject
is
that
liability
governmental
affording an extremely limited scope that all but precludes tort damages

under the statute. 22' Deterrence, the accepted rationale for any Fourth
Amendment remedy,22 is speculative at best and thus not reasonably
served under a system with so little certainty.22 3 Premising liability on

such extensive factors, the likelihood of a court finding for aggrieved
litigants is incredibly small. So too, then, is the threat of monetary
repercussions against the government (and in turn, those officers making
arrests on its behalf). Police do not fear, and indeed, have no incentive to
fear, a punishment with no practical application. Therefore, deterrence is
not practically achieved. Like civil damages, governmental liability

pales in comparison to exclusion as far as effectiveness in achieving this
result. While, as in the discussion above, Herring is not irreparably
the Amendment generally calls for warrants and probable cause for all searches and seizures,
and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence-is initially plausible but ultimately
misguided.... [T]he Amendment presupposes a civil damage remedy, not exclusion of
evidence in criminal trials .... ").
216. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
217. Id. at 645-46.
218. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 39, at 362-63.
219. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-80 (2006).
220. Meltzer, supra note 194, at 285 n.201 ("Traditionally, the Act excluded liability for claims
arising out of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, defamation, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. Since 1974, the
Act has permitted liability for most of these claims when committed by 'investigative or law
enforcement officers,' a category defined to mean federal officials empowered to make searches or
arrests." (quoting 28 U.S.C § 2680(h))).
221. Id. at 285.
222. Id. at 249 ("[T]he principal, or at times exclusive, purpose of allowing [litigants] to obtain
a deterrent remedy is to benefit the public at large (or at least some portion of it) by deterring
government conduct that threatens to violate the constitutional rights of others.").
223. Id. at 285.
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harmed by its omission of this remedy or those discussed herein, their
consideration plays a necessary role, however small, in Fourth
Amendment discourse.
Criminal prosecutions of offending officers have garnered even less
support. Although "[r]emedies aimed directly at officers who break the
law seem, at least in theory, more suited to the task of deterring police
misconduct, 22 4 there is an understandable reluctance among lawmakers
and the judiciary to adhere (with any enthusiasm) to a rule of law
criminalizing often harmless conduct. Furthermore, "a criminal
prosecution would require some showing of intent, which would mean
that many violations of the Fourth Amendment standards of objective
reasonableness would go unpunished and undeterred., 225 This, in effect,
would mark an extension of Herring logic, immunizing any conduct by
law enforcement that fails to meet some heightened mens rea constraint.
A Fourth Amendment violation, even if committed with mere
negligence, demands some form of recourse. Imposing possible criminal
sanctions upon those policemen subverting the Constitution would only
provide more opportunity for courts to craft exceptions where an offense
stemmed only from negligence. And, such an inference would be far
more sufferable than the immunity set forth in Herring, since here,
prosecution far outstrips exclusion in terms of severity. As a result, it is
unlikely that the remedy would be "rigorously enforced in any but the
most egregious cases,' 226 especially since enforcement would be the
"task for other government actors, including police departments and
prosecutors."227
The last, and most inconspicuous, of the proposed remedies, police
regulations and departmental discipline, receive far less recognition than
civil damages, but promise to achieve "much of what those monetary
damage actions may not, at least by way of individual law enforcement
actor's compliance with constitutional regulations., 228 Perhaps less
extreme than criminal prosecution but with more bite than civil
damages, Professors Roger Goldman and Steven Puro have offered
strong support for "decertification" of officers who have violated the

224. Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies: The Court that Cried "Wolf,"
467, 503 (2007).

77 MiSS. L.J.

225. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 39, at 362.
226. Cloud, supranote 224, at 504.
227. Id.
228. Christian Halliburton, Leveling the Playing Field: A New Theory of Exclusion for a PostPATRIOTAct America, 70 MO. L. REV. 519, 541 n. 111 (2005).
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Constitution in the course of their official duties. 229 As opposed to
termination of an officer's employment by a local department, which
"does not prevent the officer from being rehired by a different
department, '230 revocation of a certificate "prevents the officer from
continuing to serve in law enforcement" anywhere in the state. 23 1 The
most prominent benefit to this approach is its "middle of the road"
nature-neither too harsh nor too uncertain. The poles of this spectrum
merit far greater criticism than decertification: one for not realizing any
true deterrent assistance, the other for being legislatively unpopular.
Goldman and Puro's proposal may in some senses then, be considered a
"viable alternative or supplement to the exclusion of evidence in a
criminal case. 232 However, its primary limitation, as compared to
exclusion, is that it "leaves the individual whose rights were
compromised out of the equation.' 233 Though deterrence may be
achieved, no redress is made available for litigants in Herring's position.
It remains clear that exclusion holds a position of favor in Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases. No alternative remedies provide
the same mix of deterrence and recourse. While the Court's Herring
opinion would have done well to strike some balance between the
benefits and deficiencies of each, it is apparent that exclusion was the
focus of the inquiry, and until more expedient remedies become
available, this trend will continue. It is a flaw, slight in consequence, but
a flaw nonetheless, to omit this discussion altogether in any search and
seizure opinion, especially now, when it has been made apparent that
exclusion needs either redefinition or replacement. Therefore,
discussions of alternatives, even if dicta, become far more significant to
modem exclusionary scholarship.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Herring casts an ominous shadow over a line of constitutional
interpretation long cultivated by judicial process. Stare decisis is far
from absolute, but some deference is justified where time and experience
have uncovered no major defects in a court rule or holding. Mapp

229. See Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to
Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 49 (1987); Roger L.
Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police
Misconduct?, 45 ST.Louis U. L.J. 541, 543-44 (2001) [hereinafter Goldman & Puro, Revocation].

230. Goldman & Puro, Revocation, supra note 229, at 542.
231. Id.
232. Halliburton, supranote 228, at 541 n. 111.
233. Id.
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marked that point at which federal exclusionary practice peaked-the
final stage of a calculated evolution. And, to this day, no alternatives
have been considered adequate replacements. Why ignore this
precedent? Though Leon's good faith exception added valuable
functionality (perhaps a necessary development), its many incarnations
have so tempered the actual exclusionary rule that its guarantees of
redress are now practically baseless. 234 Herringhas hammered the final
nail into the exclusionary rule's coffin. Before, victims of unlawful
searches and seizures could at least rely upon Evans's distinction
between court and police personnel. 35 Now, exclusion turns on an
entirely subjective determination of any offender's level of mental
culpability 236 -a calculus that will undoubtedly favor officers charged
with misconduct. Imparting this ambiguity is just one of the decision's
many flaws. It also overlooks the collective knowledge doctrine's unique
applicability to the case, an argument that, if made, would have
displayed great judicial resourcefulness in the face of difficult
constitutional issues. As it now stands, the decision exhibits only the
outcome-driven analysis of a Court harshly divided by partisanship. And
moreover, it forecloses the possibility of any consistency in exclusionary
judgments-marking an uncertain standard for those seeking justice.
Throwing the Fourth Amendment to the wayside, Herring v. United
States marks a failure of both Constitutional interpretation and judicial
neutrality.
Sean D. Doherty*

234. See supra text accompanying notes 39-57.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 151-56.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
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